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SWISS BANKS AND THEIR AMERICAN CLIENTS:
A FADING ROMANCE
The gold drain, the international finances of organized
crime, the continuing vulnerability of securities markets to man-
ipulation and misrepresentation, and the feeling of the "little
man" that he shoulders a disproportionate share of the tax bur-
den have all directed hostile public attention to those nations
which recognize banking secrecy. There are a number of such
jurisdictions;' but four centuries of uninterrupted political and
economic stability, the solidarity of the franc and a deep-rooted
commitment to financial privacy have made Swiss banks the tra-
ditional favorite of Americans seeking the protection of secret ac-
counts, and therefore the most heavily criticized in the United
States. The Swiss Supreme Court recently made a significant de-
parture from established Swiss policy on disclosure of banking
secrets, and the United States has enacted major legislation to im-
pede the use of secret accounts to escape its domestic laws. It is
the purpose of this comment to examine these developments and
evaluate their impact on Americans who bank in Switzerland.
I. THE PROBLEMS
The Swiss bank account has long been a basic financial
planning tool in the hands of moneyed citizens of underdeveloped
nations who face chronic inflation, oppressive taxation, and con-
fiscation by revolutionary regimes. Legend places the untold
wealth of American millionaires and racketeers in the vaults of
Switzerland. Since the advent of relatively low cost jet travel
many Americans of more moderate means have discovered that
the secret bank account is not a luxury available only to the rich.2
1. The Bahamas, Curacao, Hong Kong, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Pan-
ama and West Germany all have bank secrecy laws which have been employed
by Americans in various schemes. Note, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6
TExAs I. L.F. 105 (1970).
2. Harry D. Schultz, London financial consultant, has estimated that
20,000 to 30,000 Americans have Swiss bank accounts with an aggregate value
of between $100 and $200 million. An account may be opened by mail with a
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This revelation naturally resulted from the general sophisti-
cation which the prosperity of the 1960's brought to the financial
affairs of the mushrooming upper middle class. An American
who wishes to accumulate and preserve wealth must jump myriad
legal hurdles and bump heads with the highly professional regu-
latory agencies which are continually erecting them. The
strength and intelligence of the adversary have improved the
breed, so that the successful American "white-collar criminal" is
necessarily a very resourceful individual-who would inevitably
discover the advantages of banking secrecy.
A plethora of schemes to beat the system have been hatched
behind the legal walls which surround every Swiss bank. Most
frequently they have been conceived to evade taxes or to circum-
vent securities regulations, although secret accounts can be useful
in accomplishing any number of illicit purposes. Among the
endless possibilities are black market currency dealings,3 kick-
backs and bribes to military and government officials,4 and gold
trading.5
The most elementary tax evasion device is simply to deposit
a suitcase full of unreported income in a Swiss bank. This alter-
native is available only to those who are paid by other individuals
free of withholding tax, typically doctors and lawyers, and those
who are in a position to skim cash receipts: archetypically gam-
bling casino operators,6 but more prosaically ordinary retailers.
deposit of $100, according to Felix W. Schulthers, Chairman of the Swiss Credit
Bank of Zurich, one of the "big three" Swiss banks. Wall Street Journal,
June 10, 1971, at 1, col. 4. A "conservative" estimate of total American hold-
ings in secret foreign accounts "could easily run into the hundreds of millions of
dollars." Trying to Unveil Secret Bank Accounts, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 28, 1970, at
98. Naturally, any accounting is more or less guesswork.
3. See Statement of Lane Dwinell, Assistant Administrator for Admin-
istration, Agency For International Development; accompanied by Daniel Cohen,
Special Assistant to Chief, Financial Review Division; Leslie A. Grant, Deputy
General Counsel, and Robert R. Parker, Former Attache and Chairman of the
Irregular Practices Committee, American Embassy, Saigon, Vietnam, Hearings
on H.R. 15073 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., at 122-28 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 150731.
4. See Statement of Frank A. Bartino, Assistant General Counsel,
Manpower and Reserve Affairs for the Department of Defense, id. at 128-135,
and Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1970, at 13, col. 1.
5. E.g., the Justice Department has charged Bernard Cornfeld and his
Geneva-based mutual fund complex, I.O.S. Ltd., with buying and selling $37.5
million in gold for speculation during the 1968 gold crisis, reaping a profit of
nearly $9 million. Wall Sreet Journal, Dec. 3, 1971, at 4, col. 2.
6. See Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1966, at 1, col. 7.
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Since Swiss banks provide the investment services of their Ameri-
can counterparts, as well as those provided by brokerage houses,
the Swiss bank depositor's unreported income is working for him
rather than being eaten by inflation in a wall safe or safety deposit
box.
The benefits of a Swiss account have not been available ex-
clusively to cash operators who can avoid reporting income.
Anyone who deals overseas can divert money into a Swiss bank
via the double invoice system.7  An American seller can instruct
his foreign buyer to deposit a portion of the sale price into the
seller's Swiss account and remit the remainder to the seller in the
United States, which will be recorded as the gross receipts from
the transaction. The American seller provides the foreign buyer
with an invoice for the full price. Similarly, an American buyer
of imported goods instructs his seller to issue an invoice in an
amount greater than the purchase price. He then transmits this
sum to the seller who retains the actual sale price, and deposits
the balance in the American buyer's Swiss account.
Americans who have already paid taxes have experienced
little difficulty depositing money in Swiss accounts without the In-
ternal Revenue Service discovering its new location. Limited
amounts can be carried to a point conveniently outside the coun-
try and from there transmitted to a Swiss bank.8 In the case of
more substantial sums, U.S. citizens have formed Lichtenstein
trusts to which they "loan" money. 9 The trust would then open
7. A slightly more complicated, but safer, device employed by American
sellers involves payment of "commissions" to an alter ego Liechtenstein trust.
See Statement of Robert Morganthau, [former] U.S. Attorney, Southern District
of New York, Hearings on the Legal and Economic Impact of Foreign Banking
Procedures on the United States Before the House Committee on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 14 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings],
and Statement of Pierre Laval, Former Chief Attorney, Appellate Division,
Southern District of New York, Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 3, at 11.
8. Swiss banks have been known to send courriers to pick up the de-
posits of their American clients, as well as representatives to solicit new busi-
ness in the United States. See Wall Street Journal, Nov. 27, 1968 at 1, col. I
and Wall Street Journal, supra note 4.
9. Business trusts may be established anonymously under Liechtenstein
law. A local lawyer will set up the legal entity for a modest fee, listing himself
as founder in the Commercial Register. The name of the owner never appears
anywhere. The entity need not have a business office in Liechtenstein; an
"authorized representative" is all the presence that is required. Hearings on
H.R. 15073, supra note 3, at 366-67, has a brief explanation. The tiny princi-
pality shares a common boundary with Switzerland, making for close coopera-
tion between Liechtenstein lawyers and Swiss bankers. One Liechtenstein law-
yer is reputed to be the president of some 400 corporations. Id. at 45.
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a Swiss account, deposit the cash and default on the "loan." Not
only has the "lender" gotten his money out of the country on a
pretense which can not be proven fraudulent, but he has also ac-
quired a bad debt deduction against future reported income.'I
American investors have employed Swiss accounts to mask vio-
lations of U.S. securities regulations with notable success." Ef-
fective policing of securities markets by the Securities Exchange
Commission depends on the ability to recreate market activity.' 2
Enforcement of the regulations is a relatively manageable task
when all records pertinent to a transaction, such as margin agree-
ments and the identities of real parties in interest, are available to
the SEC. But it becomes impossible when the "paper trail" ends
at the door of a Swiss bank.
The most problematic area for the SEC has been the use of
Swiss banking secrecy to circumvent margin requirements.' 3 Vio-
lent price fluctuation can result when market activity in a stock
is being financed by large amounts of unregulated credit.' 4
Foreign lenders are not subject to the margin requirements,' 5 so
10. Id. at 26.
11. Americans suspected of using Swiss accounts for various illegal activi-
ties generally have fared well, judging from the reults of an intensive 1969 in-
vestigation in the Southern District of New York. For each case prosecuted
there were six where the U.S. Attorney had specific information that a crime
had been committed but could not prosecute, and "thousands" of others not even
touched by the investigation. Id. at 91.
12. See Statement of Robert M. Morganthau, U.S. Attorney for the South-
era District of New York, Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 3, at 20-24,
and Statement of Irving M. Pollack, Director, Division of Trading and Markets,
Securities and Exchange Commission, id. at 175-311, for a comprehensive sur-
vey, including examples and figures, of the variety of stock market intrigues
which have been shielded by Swiss bank secrecy.
13. Current margin requirements are found in 12 C.F.R. § 207.5 (1970)
established pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7, 48 Stat. 886,
as amended 15 U.S.C. 78g (1970).
14. Securities are commonly purchased "on margin;" that is, on credit
collateralized by the securities themselves. When the market value of the se-
curities falls below a certain level, the lender has insufficient collateral and
will make a "margin call." The borrower must then put up additional collateral
or be "sold out" by the lender. Selling, of course, depresses the market and
margin calls go out to other borrowers, in turn pushing the market farther
down as they are sold out, and so on. This is called a "spiral effect." When
credit is tightly regulated, the same amount of credit extended will purchase
fewer shares, so fewer are sold to liquidate loans in a market decline, and
spiraling is minimized. But the greater the proportion of credit which may be
extended to the value of the securities purchased, the more the shares which
may be purchased on the same amount of credit, and the more which will be
dumped as the market starts to recede. Hence, the spiral is accelerated.
15. The courts have consistently denied extraterritorial application of the
Vol. 3
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American investors have frequently traded on insufficiently col-
lateralized purpose credit obtained from Swiss banks.16  Such vio-
lations have gone largely undetected because Swiss banking se-
crecy prevents SEC discovery of the identity of the investor and
the terms of his credit arrangement.1
7
The margin requirements are applicable to the conglom-
erate financing a tender offer as well as to the in-and-out trader.1
8
The position of minority stock holders is clearly jeopardized when
an overextended acquiring company defaults and controlling in-
terest falls into the hands of a Swiss bank, possibly acting as
agent for unknown principals.' 9
margin regulations; e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Transamerica Corp., 303
F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
16. E.g., 1969 Arzi Bank AG of Zurich plead guilty to charges of allowing
its American clients to trade over $20 million in securities on as little as
10% margin. See Statement of Robert Morganthau, U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 3, at 23,
and Wall Street Journal, Dec. 2, 1968, at 10, col. 3.
17. Sophisticated stock market cabals are rarely exposed without the help
of cooperative insiders, as in the Gulf Coast Leaseholds case, 1968 Hearings,
supra note 7, at 12-13. American promoters acting through four Liechtenstein
trusts acquired 750,000 shares of worthless unregistered stock. The stock was
sold through American brokerage houses at prices manipulated to over $16 a
share. Once the profits were tucked away in Swiss accounts, the stock rapidly
fell to under a dollar. One of the American promoters managed to parlay an
original investment of $20.80 into profits of over $4 million. United States v.
Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966).
18. A stock secured loan made for the business purpose of purchasing a
controlling interest in a corporation is subject to Federal Reserve Board Regu-
lation U (which applies to United States banking institutions). 12 C.F.R.
§ 221.110(b)(2) (1969). Eurodollar financing of tender offers became popular
during the conglomerate epidemic of the late 1960's. The advantage of foreign
financing was illustrated when Kirk Kirkorian, through his privately held Tracy
Investment Company, took over Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM). When the
financing arranged in the United States was blocked on antitrust grounds, Tracy
arranged to borrow $62 million from two European banks. Both loans re-
quired a pledge of securities having a value of not less than 150% of the value
of the loan as collateral. A United States lender would have had to require a
pledge of securities having a value of not less than 500% of the loan under the
domestic requirement of 80% margin then in effect. See generally Statement of
Irving M. Pollack, Director, Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 3, at 176-77, 297-98.
19. In 1969 Liquidonics Industries purchased controlling interest in UMC
Industries with a loan of $40 million from the Banque de Paris at des Pays-Bas
(Suisse). Liquidonics went into arrears and was forced to sell its interest in
UMC to Overseas International Corp., S.A., a Luxembourg subsidiary of
Banque de Paris. It was clear that control of UMC had shifted to Banque de
Paris, but it was not clear whether Banqe de Paris had purchased the stock
5
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Corporate insiders, trading on the basis of inside informa-
tion and not filing insider forms, have obscured their identities
through Swiss banks, making it impossible to link trader with
trade.20 The insider's advantage could be enhanced by trading
on excessive margin to maximize leverage; the profits from such
n-and-out trading could of course be taken free of U.S. short-
term capital gains treatment.
Several clever techniques have been developed to repatriate
the untaxed wealth held by market speculators and other taxpay-
ers in Swiss accounts. An account holder could "borrow" his
own money from his Swiss bank, a service regularly performed
by Swiss banks for a nominal fee.2 ' The taxpayer got the use of
his money and avoided a tax prosecution on a "net worth" theory,
plus he could deduct the interest that he was paying himself on
the "loan." Or he could "sell" assets to himself through his
Swiss bank.22 He would keep the property, the income accumu-
lating in his account, and his repatriated money would be taxed
at the long term capital gains rate. An extra layer of insulation
could be provided by forming a Lichtenstein trust to "buy" the
property.
II. THE Swiss LAW
Swiss banking secrecy manifests the traditional Swiss belief
in the unfettered right of personal privacy, particularly with re-
gard to financial affairs. Its existence in private law dates back
to the advent of organized banking in the sixteenth century.23
The banker's pledge of secrecy was first recognized in customary
law and then later as part of the mandatory's duty of loyalty as
well as the individual's right of privacy. 24  Tort liability to the
"master of the secret" subsequently attached to a banker's viola-
as principal or as an agent for undisclosed interests. Hearings on H.R.
15073, supra note 3, at 176-77, 293-96.
20. E.g., 1968 Hearings, supra note 7, at 55-61 and Hearings on H.R.
15073, supra note 3, at 12-13, 21-22.
21. This is called a "plugged" or "window dressing" loan; it is a standard
technique in organized crime for legitimizing illegally obtained funds. State-
ment of Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice, 1968 Hearings, supra note 7, at 7-10. An ingenious
derivation is the "three cornered window dressing loan," used to "beef up" the
anemic balance sheet of an American borrower. Id. at 52, for a brief explana-
tion of the details.
22. Id. at 49.
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tion of the right to privacy in financial affairs, and a client can
also recover damages under a contract of agency theory. 25 Swiss
courts have traditionally held that confidentiality is an implied
contractual obligation not dependent on an express agreement. 26
It was not until the 1930's that banking secrecy was estab-
lished in public law. Nazi Germany was attempting to gain ac-
cess to assets which had been placed in Swiss banks by German
Jews and other enemies of the Reich.2" To guarantee protection
of depositors against such threats, the Swiss Parliament codified
the banker's duty in article 47(b) of the Banking Law of 1934:28
Anyone who in his capacity as an officer or employee of a
bank, or as an auditor or his employee, or as a member
of the banking commission or as an officer or employee of
its bureau intentionally violates his duty to observe silence
or his professional rule of secrecy or anyone who induces or
attempts to induce a person to commit any such offence,
shall be liable to a fine of up to 20,000 francs or imprison-
ment for up to six months, or both.
If the offender acted with negligence he shall be liable
to a fine up to 10,000 francs.
In addition to the criminal liability imposed by article 47(b)
of the Banking Law, a bank may be sued for damages for
breach of secrecy under article 97 of the Law of Obligations.
29
The obligation of banking secrecy is by no means absolute;
it remains primarily a matter of private law and, as such, yields to
overriding considerations of public law in certain circumstances. 0
The steadfast refusal of the Swiss government to compel disclo-
sure of banking secrets, generally attributed by Americans to the
rule of banking secrecy, are usually based as much on Swiss tax
law and the distinction which Swiss law draws between criminal
and administrative offenses as on article 47(b) of the Banking
Law and the rule of secrecy.
25. Note, supra note 1, at 117.
26. Id.
27. Fehrenbach, Secrecy, Solidarity, and Style: The Swiss Banking Mystique,
BANKERS MAG., Winter 1967, at 52.
28. Mueller, supra note 23, at 362.
29. Note, The "Secret" Swiss Account: End of an Era, 38 BRoOK. L. REV.
384, 387 (1971).
30. In addition to the duty to give evidence in civil and criminal judicial
proceedings, discussed infra, exceptions to the general rule of banking secrecy
may arise in cases involving heirs, family law, debt collection, bankruptcy and
international money transfers. Note, Secret Foreign Accounts, supra note 1,
at 119.
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A bank may be required to give evidence either by the Fed-
eral Code of Civil Procedure or by one of the cantonal codes of
procedure. 31 The application of cantonal law is expressly re-
served by article 64(3) of the Swiss Constitution, and where a
material Federal law takes precedence over cantonal procedural
law, it is always specified in the Federal law.32 The Banking
Law does not contain such a provision, so the obligation of a
bank to give evidence relating to the affairs of its clients is not
controlled by the Banking, Law, but becomes a question of can-
tonal and Federal Procedural law.3 The various cantonal codes
differ in their treatment of the subject, but the majority require
banks to render full evidence when called upon in a civil proceed-
ing. 4 The same is generally true in the case of criminal pro-
ceedings.3
5
A bank may be compelled to supply information to the tax
authorities only with the consent of the taxpayer concerned.' 6
Swiss tax law, rather than the Banking Law, achieves this result.
The taxpayer's bank is in the same position as any other third par-
ty with regard to the taxpayer's dealings with the tax authorities:
there is no obligation to give information.' 7  This is because tax
law treats the relationship between the taxpayer and the govern-
ment as a confidential one,' 8 consistent with the Swiss commit-
ment to financial privacy.
The extent of Swiss international cooperation in compelling
evidence is, of course, as circumscribed as the Federation's pow-
31. Mueller, supra note 23, at 366.
32. Id. at 366-67.
33. Id. at 367.
34. Id. at 367.
35. Note, Swiss Banks and the Avoidance of American Tax and Securities
Laws: An Assessment Based on Proposed Legislation, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 94, 96 (1970).
36. Mueller, supra note 23, at 371.
37. Id.
38. Swiss tax authorities nevertheless are able to extract revenues by virtue
of the device of "Ermessenstaxation" or "taxation d'office". Meyer, The
Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in Switzerland, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
287, 295 (1955). This is an assumption of income or wealth which the taxpayer
can rebut only by producing evidence of his debts and expenses, such as bank
statements. A taxpayer who does not supply true information to verify his tax
liabilities risks being taxed on this basis. The high withholding of 30% on
capital income and interest on bank deposits serves to prevent large-scale eva-
sion. Also, the tax authorities have access to information from the returns of
other taxpayers, so there is really no practical need for evidence from third
parties. Mueller, supra note 23, at 371.
Vol. 3
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er to compel evidence in its own interest. Like most nations,
Switzerland extends assistance in civil and criminal matters but
not in matters of administrative law.3" Switzerland will not, how-
ever, assist in the prosecution of military, political or fiscal
crimes, or in any other case where a domestic prosecution would
violate the "ordre public."4  Tax evasion, securities, and foreign
exchange violations are considered fiscal or administrative of-
fenses, therefore the Swiss refuse legal assistance in these areas.
In the case of information subject to bank secrecy, requests for
judicial cooperation will be subject to the rules of cantonal pro-
cedure.4' The Swiss Federal Court will not compel a bank to dis-
close information which it could not be required to disclose, giv-
en similar facts, under the cantonal code of civil procedure of the
particular canton.42
Banking information unavailable to the Swiss tax authori-
ties is similarly unavailable to foreign tax authorities. Generally,
a disclosure of any information concerning a taxpayer will only
be allowed where provided for by a double taxation convention.43
Information supplied to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service has
mainly concerned apportionment of profits to business operations
permanently established in one or the other country and the al-
lowance of credit by one country for withholding taxes already
paid in the other.44
The Swiss Federal Tax Administration has heretofore con-
sistently denied requests of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service for
information on assets deposited in Swiss banks or on the banking
activities of U.S. clients.45 The logic has been that third persons,
including banks, are not required to give information to tax au-
thorities in Switzerland and further, such a disclosure would be
violative of the bank's duty of secrecy.46 Both objections have re-
lied on exceptions to the general obligation to exchange informa-
tion specifically provided in the Convention with the Swiss Con-
federation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect
to Taxes on Income.47
39. Mueller, supra note 23, at 374.
40. Id. at 375.
41. Id. at 374.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 375.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 376.
47. Convention with the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double
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III. X V. THE FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION
In 1970, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court took a fresh look
at internal Swiss law and the Double Taxation Convention of May
24, 1951.48 A cynic might argue that X v. The Federal Tax Ad-
ministration was decided to placate the United States, which was
viewing with increasing disapproval the aplomb with which
Americans were using Swiss banks to neutralize United States
laws. 9 Regardless of the Court's motives, its decision was an
unprecedented departure from the traditional Swiss position on
banking secrecy.
Article XVI, paragraph 1 of the Convention" provides for
the exchange of information necessary for the "prevention of
fraud or the like," in the areas of taxation subject to the con-
vention." Pursuant to this provision the United States Internal
Revenue Service requested from the Federal Tax Administration
(FTA), its Swiss counterpart, information from bank records re-
garding the activities of an American citizen suspected of tax
fraud. The FTA conducted an investigation of its own and de-
termined that the suspicion of the IRS was well-founded. The re-
sults of the investigation were summarized in an order and the
FTA notified X and his bank that it would transmit its findings
to the IRS.
X appealed the FTA order, ultimately bringing the dispute
before the Court. Two significant issues were raised: first, un-
der what circumstances is the FTA required to furnish any infor-
mation to the IRS; second, does the FTA's obligation extend to
information protected by bank secrecy. Resolution of these ques-
Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, [1951] 2 U.S.T.
1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
48. X v. The Federal Tax Administration, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1029
(Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Dec. 23, 1970) (1971) (unofficial U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice translation), U.S. Tax Cas. (71-2, at 86566) I 9435 '(unofficial
CCH translation).
49. P.L. 91-508, discussed at length infra, had been enacted less than two
months before X v. The Federal Taxation Administration came down. The
stock market had been in a year long slump and several prominent brokerage
firms had folded. American politicians, with support from the press, were
decrying unregulated credit, insider trading, market manipulations, and other
abuses which had proliferated during the speculative euphoria of the bull
market.
50. Convention, supra note 47.
51. The United States Federal income taxes, including surtaxes and excess
profits taxes, and Swiss federal, cantonal and communal taxes on income.
Id. art. I, § 1.
Vol. 3
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tions gave the Court an opportunity to interpret the Convention.
Article XVI, paragraph 1 sets forth the obligation mutually
undertaken:
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall ex-
change such information (being information available under
the respective taxation laws of the contracting parties) as is
necessary for carrying out the provisions of the present Con-
vention or for the prevention of fraud or the like in relation
to the taxes which are subject to the present Conven-
tion .... 52
This obligation is subject to the limitations found in article XVI,
paragraph 3:53
In no case shall the provisions of this Article be construed so
as to impose upon either of the contracting States the obliga-
tion to carry out administrative measures at variance with the
regulations and practice of either contracting State or which
would be contrary to its sovereignty, security or public policy
or to supply particulars which are not procurable under its
own legislation or that of the State making application.
Noting that a distinction between prevention and suppres-
sion of fraud would be a fatuous one in the realm of fiscal regula-
tion, the Court determined that "prevention of fraud and the like"
must be read in a broad sense to mean prevention of the ultimate
success of fraudulent acts. 54 The obligation of the FTA to furn-
ish information exists, then, when tax fraud has already been
committed and, strictly speaking, can no longer be prevented.
Nor is the obligation of the FTA conditioned on the opening of
tax fraud proceedings in the United States. The Court felt that
the determination of whether or not information is necessary to
prevent fraud should not turn on such a formal criterion. All
that is really necessary is a "factually well-founded suspicion" that
tax fraud or the like has been committed or is being planned.
55
What constitutes "fraud or the like" must be interpreted ac-
cording to Swiss tax law."6 Swiss law employs varying terminol-
ogy and is not uniform in definition of the elements of a tax of-
fense, but the Court felt that it was safe to say that the use of
52. Convention, supra note 47.
53. Id.
54. X v. The Federal Taxation Administration, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
at 1031 (1971).
55. Id.
56. Convention, supra note 47, art. II, 2.
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"fraudulent means," particularly false or falsified or substantially
untrue documents, is generally considered a "serious offense."57
This is true whether the deception is an aggravated form of tax
evasion or a separate offense subject to sanctions beyond penalty
taxes. 8  Swiss doctrine universally considers deliberate decep-
tion of tax authorities by the use of substantially untrue docu-
ments for the purpose of obtaining an illegal tax advantage to be
tax-fraud. "Fraud and the like" therefore can be understood to
include "at least these offenses."5 9
Having made reasonably clear the circumstances under
which there is a general obligation to furnish information to the
IRS, the Court attacked the problem of whether banking infor-
mation can be furnished without running afoul of banking secre-
cy. Article XVI can be understood to mean that the FTA will
make available any information which it could secure from a
Swiss bank if the facts were analogously transposed.6" The de-
cisive consideration then is whether Swiss law compels a bank to
disclose information sought by the FTA to shed light on suspect-
ed fraudulent acts of the bank's client. Federal law is silent on
the question, but a variety of answers may be found in the can-
tonal tax laws.6 '
This led the Court to the question of whether the Federation
had undertaken a federal obligation to furnish banking informa-
tion in certain cases, or had merely obligated itself to exchange
that information which could be procured under applicable can-
tonal law on analogous facts. The Federation may conclude trea-
ties and international agreements on matters within the compe-
tence of the cantons, in which case any contrary cantonal law is
automatically superseded. 62 If a federal obligation had been es-
tablished by article XVI, then such an obligation would take
precedence over any divergent cantonal law, notwithstanding can-
tonal tax sovereignty provided by the Federal Constitution. 63
The Court could find no clues in either the text of the Con-
vention or the notes and materials as to whether a federal obliga-
57. X v. The Federal Tax Administration, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
at 1031 (1971).
58. Id. at 1031-32.
59. Id. at 1032.
60. Id. at 1034.
61. Id.
62. The Court cites article 8 of the Federal Constitution. Id.
63. Id. at 1035.
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tion had, in fact, been intended by the parties. This dilemma,
which, curiously, had not become apparent until 20 years after
the conclusion of the treaty, conveniently turned out to be almost
self-resolving. If the Swiss commitment was only to furnish bank
information obtainable under applicable cantonal law, then the
same information would be available or not available to the IRS,
depending on the location of the suspected American's bank. In
choosing their Swiss banks devious American taxpayers would
make the obvious geographical selection. Clearly the United
States had not bargained for a pledge of such limited value.
The Court reasoned that the United States naturally must
have been mainly interested in the availability of banking infor-
mation from Zurich, Basel and Geneva, the three internationally
important banking centers where the question would be most likely
to arise. In the cantons of Zurich, Basel-Stadt and Geneva, tax
fraud is a criminal offense and prosecutions are governed by the
respective cantonal codes of criminal procedure.64 Banks in these
cantons must give full evidence in criminal prosecutions.65 While
this is a rule of criminal procedure, its ultimate basis is in cantonal
tax legislation which defines tax fraud as a criminal offense, and
thereby renders it subject to the law of criminal procedure.66 This
is to say that banking information is compelled not only for rea-
sons of the law of criminal procedure but also, in the case of tax
fraud, for reasons of tax law.
67
The United States might readily have understood the law in
the major banking cantons to be the prevailing Swiss concept and
that banking information was, in fact, "information available
under the . . . taxation laws . . ." of Switzerland.68 The Court
could not reject the forceful insight of this analysis and concluded
that the obligation to furnish information in support of tax fraud
investigations includes banking information, despite any contrary
position expressed in the tax legislation of less internationally im-
portant cantons. 69
The significance of X v. The Federal Tax Administration to
Americans fraudulently evading taxes through Swiss accounts is




68. Convention, supra note 47, article XVI, T 1.
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evident. But, when applied in concert with a recent United
States development, its impact may be fatal to Americans utiliz-
ing Swiss bank secrecy for other schemes as well. The Federal
Income Tax Form 1040 now asks the taxpayer "[d]id you, at any
time during the taxable year, have any interest in or signature on
other authority over a bank, securities, or other financial account
in a foreign country. . . .?" If the taxpayer checks the "yes"
box, he is instructed to attach an additional form setting forth the
specifics.,0
A United States taxpayer maintaining a Swiss account as a
vehicle for any illicit purpose will necessarily deny the fact. But
if he does so he commits an act of tax fraud under federal law, 7'
and one which conforms to the definition of tax fraud formulated
in X v. The Federal Tax Administration. Use of a Swiss account
in a matter which Swiss law would treat as a fiscal or administra-
tive, rather than a criminal, offense, and for which assistance in a
United States prosecution would be refused, now necessitates an
act of tax fraud of the sort for which Switzerland has indicated it
is willing to roll back the cover of banking secrecy. The Inter-
nal Revenue Service, if it can demonstrate a "factually well-
founded suspicion" of tax fraud, would now seem to be in a posi-
tion to obtain evidence usable in a subsequent prosecution on
other charges and for which the Swiss would not make bank in-
formation available.
Whether the Court was contemplating such an eventuality
when it decided X v. The Federal Tax Administration is pure
speculation, but there is nothing in the language of the opinion
which forecloses the possibility. Perhaps the inclination of the
Court to dilute, via the Convention, the protective opacity which
Swiss law has traditionally afforded Americans can be estimated
by a comparison with its decision in Johann Senn, Bank fuer
Handel und Effekten v. United States, Office of the Zurich Dis-
70. Federal Income Tax Form 4683.
71. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7206(1) makes it a felony to: "Willfully
[make] and [subscribe] any return, statement or other document, which con-
tains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of
perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every ma-
terial matter .... ." Note that this section creates criminal tax fraud liability
for falsifying a return regardless of the tax consequences of the falsehood; it
need only be shown that the taxpayer signed a document he knew to be false.




California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1972], Art. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol3/iss1/13
SWISS BANKING SECRECY
trict Attorney and Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Canton
of Zurich.
72
In Johann Senn a United States citizen, Rosenbaum, and a
Swiss bank executive, Senn, were suspected of defrauding the
United States government of several million dollars on a Navy
rocket launcher contract using the "over-invoice" technique.
Among its costs the American contractor, controlled by Rosen-
baum, listed billings from European subcontractors, which were
in actuality Lichtenstein trusts set up by Rosenbaum, and were
not really supplying any parts at all. The contractor dutifully
paid the bogus bills presented by the fictitious suppliers and the
receipts were placed in Rosenbaum's account at Senn's bank.
The United States Department of Justice informed the Zur-
ich District Attorney, in whose jurisdiction Rosenbaum was
known to have an account, of its suspicions. An investigation by
the District Attorney resulted in a Swiss prosecution. 73  The De-
partment of Justice then applied for access to various bank rec-
ords as an injured party in a criminal prosecution.7 4  The records
were supplied, but the Swiss investigating judge required an affa-
davit that they would not be used by the United States for "fiscal
purposes.
''75
The bank information in X v. The Federal Tax Administra-
tion was requested and furnished under a different legal theory,
but, like the information in Johann Senn, it was for use in a
criminal prosecution .7  In allowing the breach of banking secre-
cy in X v. The Federal Tax Administration, the Court made no
stipulations as to how the information could or could not be used
72. Johann Senn, Bank fuer Handel und Effekten v. United States of
America, Office of the Zurich District Attorney, Office of the Public Prosecutor
of the Canton of Zurich, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 567 (1970) (Swiss Federal
Court, Session of Oct. 1, 1969) (unofficial U.S. Department of Justice
translation).
73. The Zurich District Attorney Rosenbaum, Senn and other unidenti-
fied parties with forging of documents, being an accessory to fraud, aiding and
abetting forging of documents and concealing stolen goods. Id. at 568.
74. Section 10(3), Zurich Code of Criminal Procedures reads:
The injured party must be given an opportunity to inspect the files and
to be present at the interrogation of the accused, so far as this can
be accomplished without prejudice to the purpose of the investigation.
The bank information requested by the United States had been examined by the
Zurich District Attorney and included in his investigation file. The Court saw
no reason to treat a public body differently than a private person if it has been
directly injured by a criminal act. Johann Senn, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
at 574 (1970).
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beyond the tax fraud prosecution. In Johann Senn the Court did
not reach the question of whether the United States would still
have been granted access to the records had it not filed the formal
declaration that they would not be used for fiscal purposes. It
did, however, emphasize the fact that the declaration had been
made in its rejection of the argument that banking secrecy had
been violated, 77 strongly inferring that such a declaration is pre-
requisite to a disclosure of bank information for use in a foreign
criminal prosecution.78
There is nothing in the Convention to prevent Switzerland
from requiring assurances that information furnished pursuant to
article XVI will be used exclusively for the purpose specified in
the Article. Such a requirement would be so consistent with tra-
ditional Swiss policy that its absence is conspicuous in X v. The
Federal Tax Administration, indicating at least a willingness to
decide on a case by case basis what latitude the United States may
exercise with respect to bank evidence obtained under the Con-
vention, and at most the tacit repeal of Swiss banking and tax
law for Americans.
IV. RECENT UNITED STATES LAW
By 1968 the role of banks in secrecy jurisdictions, notably
Switzerland, in a variety of illegal activities ranging from income
tax evasion to heroin smuggling had become obvious. 79 Negoti-
ations with Switzerland had begun but did not appear promising.
In view of the dim prospects on the international front, the House
Banking and Currency Committee convened to study the prob-
lem and explore possible domestic solutions.8 0 Testimony was
solicited from the federal agencies and private interests con-
cerned.8' What emerged was Public Law 91-508,82 containing
the Foreign Accounts and Currency Transactions Reporting
Act. 3 The three titles of the new legislation erect a highly de-
tailed statutory structure, the main thrust of which is to make
77. Id. at 578-80.
78. Id.
79. The horribles are paraded in detail in 1968 Hearings, supra note 7, and
Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 2.
80. See generally, 1968 Hearings, supra note 7, and Hearings on H.R.
15073, supra note 3.
81. Id.
82. Pub. L. No. 91-508 (Oct. 26, 1970), 84 Stat. 1114-1136 (codified in
scattered sections of 12, 15, 31 U.S.C. (1970)).
. 83. 31 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970).
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anonymous movement of significant sums in currency, near-money
and readily liquidated securities, impossible.
Title I governs federally insured banks,84 uninsured banks
and other financial institutions,85 requiring the maintainance of
records which the Secretary of the Treasury finds are valuable in
criminal, tax and regulatory investigations and proceedings. 86  In-
sured banks must maintain records of each account-holder and of
each person who is authorized to act with respect to each ac-
count.87 In addition, a microfilm or other reproduction of each
check, draft or instrument drawn and presented for payment, or
received for deposit or collection, must be made.88  Additional
records may, by regulation, be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury.89 All records are to be retained for the period speci-
fied by the Secretary, which shall not exceed six years unless the
Secretary determines that a longer period is necessary.9" These
requirements are subject to exemption by the Secretary.9
Uninsured banks and other "financial institutions" may be
required to retain records of any type prescribed for insured
banks.92 "Financial institutions" include persons in the business
of issuing or redeeming checks, money orders, traveler's checks
or similar instruments; 93 transferring funds or credits;94 operating
a currency exchange or otherwise dealing in foreign currencies or
credits; 95 operating a credit card system;96 or performing any
similar, related or substitute functions.97 Compliance may be en-
forced by injunction;98 civil99 and criminal' penalties are pre-
scribed, which are substantially increased when the infraction oc-
curs in furtherance of a violation of another federal law.' For
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(2) (1970).
85. Id. § 1953(b).
86. Id. §§ 1829b(a)(2), 151(b).
87. Id. § 1829b(c).
88. Id. § 1829b(d)(1).
89. Id. § 1829b(f).
90. Id. § 1829b(g).
91. Id. § 1829b(c).
92. Id. § 1953(a)(1).
93. Id. § 1953(b)(1).
94. Id. § 1953(b)(2).
95. Id. § 1953(b)(3).
96. Id. § 1953(b)(4).
97. Id. § 1953(b)(5).
98. Id. § 1954.
99. Id. § 1955.
100. Id. § 1956.
101. Id. § 1957.
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purposes of these penalties, a separate offense occurs with respect
to each day on which, and each separate branch or office in
which, the violation continues. 102
Title II is the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act,' authorizing the Secretary to require reports from a daz-
zling array of businesses: banks, brokers and dealers in securi-
ties and commodities, insurance companies, pawn brokers, jew-
elers and travel agencies, to name a few.'04 The same civil,105
criminal,'06 and injunctive' 0 7 sanctions available under Title I
may be imposed. Domestic financial institutions may be directed
to report transactions involving the payment, receipt on transfer
of United States currency or monetary instruments in such
amounts or denominations and under such circumstances as the
Secretary may designate. 10 8 Such reports may also be required of
the other parties to such transactions.' The export or import of
any monetary instruments totalling over $5,000 on any one oc-
casion must be reported; 10 if no report is made, the instruments
are subject to seizure and forfeiture to the government."' The
Secretary may call for reports of transactions with foreign agen-
cies in such form and disclosing such information as he finds ap-
propriate." 2  He may also exempt or include persons, by class or
individual, as well as transactions by magnitude, type or country
involved.113
Title M amends section 7 of the Securities Exhange Act of
19341" to apply the various margin regulations to United States
borrowers, and foreign borrowers acting on behalf of, or in con-
junction with, or controlled by, United States persons, without re-
gard to where the lenders place of business is located or where the
transaction occurred. Prior to the enactment of Title HI only
lenders were bound to comply with the regulations and borrowers
trading on nonconforming credit risked no liability." 5  The Se-
102. Id. § 1953(a)(2).
103. 31 U.S.C. § 1051-1122 (1970).
104. Id. § 1052(e).
105. Id. § 1056.
106. Id. § 1058.
107. Id. § 1057.
108. Id. § 1081.
109. Id. § 1082.
110. Id. § 1101.
111. Id. § 1102.
112. Id. § 1121.
113. Id. § 1122.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1970).
115. Id. § 78g(c), (d).
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curities Exchange Act has always limited the amount of credit
which may be extended to purchase or carry securities to a certain
percentage of their current market value, subject to periodic ad-
justment by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. 16 As investors have found new sources of purpose credit,
the coverage of the margin regulations has been broadened to in-
clude more lending activities." 7  Recently American investors
seeking greater leverage in the market have been borrowing ex-
tensively from foreign lenders, capitalizing on the immunity of
these leaders from domestic margin restrictions, and thereby in-
troducing large amounts of unregulated credit into American se-
curities markets. Where the SEC was formerly powerless, it may
now move to thwart undercollateralized speculative adventures,
tender offers and take over attempts financed overseas.
P.L. 91-508 met strenuous objection at the hearing level.
Bankers complained that making such extensive records and re-
ports would be inordinately expensive and time-consuming, gen-
erally burdensome, and inflationary. The rapid clearing of fi-
nancial transactions, essential in American economic life, would
be seriously inhibited."18  It was hoped that the regulatory pow-
er of the Secretary would be exercised to minimize the paper
which P.L. 91-508 would necessitate, but when the proposed reg-
ulations to Titles I and 11 appeared on June 10, 1971" 9 the
banking industry was disappointed to find that the Secretary had
not retreated from the demanding stance taken by Congress.
Vigorous protest resulted in a second and somewhat relaxed set
of regulations issued on April 5, 1972.12°
All banks and financial institutions are to file reports of cur-
rency transactions greater than $10,000,121 unless the transaction
116. Id. § 78g(b).
117. The lending practices of brokers and dealers are covered by FRB Reg-
ulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1970). Banks are subject to FRB Regulation U,
Id., § 221. FRB Regulation G was adopted to control credit supplied by non-
broker, nonbank lenders. Id., § 207. To implement Title III, the Board has
adopted Regulation X, Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 224.1-224-6, 36 Fed. Reg.
19901-04 (1971).
118. See Statement of Clifford C. Sommer, Vice President, The American
Bankers Association, Hearings on H.R. 15073, supra note 3, at 312-316, and
Statement of Carl W. Desch, Senior Vice President, First National City Bank of
New York, On Behalf of the New York Clearing House Association, id. at
316-322.
119. Proposed Treas. Reg. H§ 103.11-103.49, 36 Fed. Reg. 11208-11211
(1971).
120. Id. §§ 103.11-103.50, 37 Fed. Reg. 6912-6915 (1972).
121. Id. § 103.22(a), id. at 6913.
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is solely with another financial institution or with an established
customer in an amount reasonably commensurate with the ordi-
nary conduct of the customer's business.' 22 A report must be
made of the customers whose transactions qualify for this exemp-
tion.' 3 The identity of any person with or for whom an unex-
empted transaction is effected must be verified and reported.' 24
Financial institutions must retain a microfilm copy of each exten-
sion of credit over $5,000 unless it is secured by an interest in
real property.' 5 Copies must be made of all instructions given
or received regarding any transaction intended to result in the
transfer of $10,000 or more in currency, securities, monetary in-
struments or credit to a person, account or place outside the Unit-
ed States.'26 Copies are required of checks, drafts, money or-
ders and all other items, other than bank or periodic charges
which debit any bank deposit account. 27  An exception is pro-
vided for dividend, payroll, insurance claim and similar checks on
accounts on which 100 or more checks per month are expected to
be drawn. 2 " Banks must also retain copies of all items of more
than $10,000 received from or remitted to any party outside the
United States. 129  All copies required by the regulations must
show both front and back of the item unless the back is complete-
ly blank or contains only standardized information, 1 0 and shall
be retained for a period of five years."'
There is no question that P.L. 91-508 makes it very diffi-
cult to move a quantity of money unnoticed into a foreign bank
account, and it is possible that its criminal sanctions will act as a
further deterrent to Americans considering such a move. But
whether the gathering of evidence useful in prosecuting violations
of various United States laws will be facilitated, the averred pur-
pose of the law," 2 is questionable. The bulk of the data gener-
ated is staggering; sufficiently so, that the sheer size of the "hay-
stack" might very well make the discovery of incriminating
122. Id. § 103.22(b), id. at 6913.
123. Id.
124. Id. § 103.26, id. at 6913.
125. Id. § 103.33(a), id. at 6914.
126. Id. § 103.33(b), (c), id. at 6914.
127. Id. § 103.34(b), id. at 6914.
128. Id. § 103.34(b)(3), id. at6914.
129. Id. § 103.34(b)(5), (7), id. at 6914.
130. Id. § 103.36(a), id. at 6914.
131. Id. § 103.36(c), id. at 6914.
132. 12 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970), 31 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970).
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"needles" costly beyond proportion to any value they might have.
Moreover, creation of elaborate bureaucratic machinery to en-
force punctilious adherence to the Secretary's specifications will
certainly be necessary if the law is to be effective. It is interest-
ing to note that the responsibility for insuring compliance with
the regulations is delegated to any one of eight separate federal
agencies, depending on the institutional identity of the record-keep-
er or report-maker.' 33
The approach taken by P.L. 91-508 is that evidence of cer-
tain types of domestic transactions will eliminate the need for evi-
dence of foreign transactions made unreachable by bank secrecy.
The hitch, of course, is that an astute law breaker who can move
his money without a paper trail will leave the government unable
to prove any wrongdoing. For example, the currency transac-
tions of those who regularly deal in large amounts of cash are not
reported; no doubt many present or potential secret account hold-
ers either fall into this category, or else have access to such a
"front." This shortcoming is largely avoided by a possible solu-
tion which has the important advantage of being far less ponder-
ous than P.L. 91-508. Rebuttable income tax presumptions rely
on the premise that money in a secret foreign account has no val-
ue to its owner unless it can be repatriated in such a manner that
the IRS cannot prosecute on a net worth theory. Working on this
theory, a Treasury Department spokesman has suggested a pre-
sumption to deal with taxpayers who bring their money home by
"borrowing" it from their secret accounts. 134 Where a taxpayer
borrows from a foreign financial institution, claiming he has fur-
nished no collateral when a reasonable lender would have re-
quired it, and the taxpayer refuses to divulge any information,
then it would be presumed that the loan was collateralized by the
taxpayer's own funds. The taxpayer must then demonstrate that
the money is actually borrowed or the IRS will treat it as income.
The IRS might devise other presumptions along the same
line, perhaps even a blanket presumption that all receipts from
foreign sources are from the taxpayer's own assets. In cases
where the IRS suspects that assets are being hidden abroad by
bank secrecy, it would require the taxpayer to prove the legitima-
133. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 103.46(a)(1)-(8), 37 Fed. Reg. 6915 (1972).
134. Statement of Hon. Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the
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cy of a foreign transaction. In all other cases the taxpayer would
not be required to overcome the presumption. The use of secret
accounts for illegal purposes other than tax evasion per se would
also be frustrated, since all such schemes necessarily involve at
least some evasion of United States taxes. Such a solution would
inevitably inconvenience a few blameless taxpayers, but this is a
relatively small price to be paid by only a few.
V. CONCLUSION
The ubiquitous surveillance of the financial lives of all Unit-
ed States citizens is unnecessary and wasteful, particularly in the
light of the more cooperative Swiss attitude expressed in X v. The
Federal Tax Administration. The cost in time and money of
chronicling every detail of day-to-day banking activity imposes
an unfair assessment on the American banking public, from
whom it is ultimately exacted, for information of unknown en-
forcement value. It is by no means a remote possibility that this
information has no value whatsoever. "White collar criminals"
have proven themselves remarkably ingenious and not easily de-
terred; they should be expected to discover all the loopholes in
the Act, and to develop new forms of monetary value suitable for
transmission out of the United States without a trace to be found
in the mountains of records and reports.
More important than the practical aspects of P.L. 91-508
are the broader policy issues it raises. Banking privacy in the
United States enjoys a certain amount of constitutional protection
which is seriously imperiled by the government's effort to cope
with foreign banking secrecy. 135 A three-judge District Court
panel has ruled that Title II of the Act is an unconstitutional in-
vasion of the right of privacy, and has issued a preliminary injunc-
tion barring banks from making the reports which it calls for.'36
This decision underestimates the danger: the mere existence of
comprehensive records detailing an individual's financial affairs
invites "fishing expeditions" by regulatory agencies. That the
government engages in widespread secret surveillance of its citi-
zens, without regard for constitutional prohibitions, has been a
shocking revelation to the American public. It is, however, a fact
135. See generally United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d
129 (3d Cir. 1967), Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578,
367 P.2d 284 (1961).
136. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 12, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
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of life, and P.L. 91-508 lends statutory legitimacy to govern-
mental intrusion into the private lives of Americans, as well as en-
couraging even further snooping beyond that which is expressly
authorized.
The Currency and Foreign Transactions Act should also be
considered in the context of the international monetary policy of
the United States. The American dollar is the leading reserve
and trading currency in the world; this is due in part to the long-
standing American conviction that currency restrictions of any
kind are anathema. Holders have rested assured that their dol-
lars could be readily deposited in and withdrawn from United
States banks, and converted into other currencies without limita-
tions. The Act does not impose currency restrictions by any
means. It does, however, bespeak a new United States anxious-
ness to exercise some control over the flow of dollars in and out
of the United States, which could be interpreted by the interna-
tional financial community as a harbinger of restricted dollar li-
quidity. In the wake of recent blows to the prestige of the dollar,
the United States would seem ill-advised to pursue any policy
which might reflect anything less than an unqualified commit-
ment to continuing dollar convertability.
John J. Lannan
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